THE EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE RESEARCH PROGRAMME: DEGENERATIVE OR PROGRESSIVE?
The notion of epistemic injustice introduced by Miranda Fricker in 2007 raised interest in the harmful effects of prejudice within analytic philosophy and beyond. It inspired various projects linking ethics and epistemology. The notion, originally used to capture the epistemic disadvantage that people experience for their race or gender, has been applied to an increasing number of domains. In this topical collection, we gather contributions to the debate about the strengths and limitations of the epistemic injustice research programme.
Deadline for submission: 30 September 2026
Notification of acceptance: 8 January 2027
For further queries, please email Lisa (l.bortolotti@bham.ac.uk) or Elisabetta (elisabetta.lalumera@unibo.it) and write “Argumenta EI Special Issue” in the subject of the email
